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A phenomenon as large and widespread as the wave of mergers
centering about the peak years of 1899—1901 has called forth many
explanations, none of which commanded general acceptance. The
data on mergers (and on other important and related economic
series) were inadequate for careful tests. Having no even remotely
similar precedent, the wave seemed to be historically unique. Thus
the phenomenon was explained largely in terms of broad historical
developments.
The present examination takes the form of separate empirical
tests of relationships between the merger wave and certain his-
torical developments in the United States that have been credited
with causing it. Briefly, they are: retardation of industrial growth;
the immediately preceding expansion of the national railroad
system; the growth of a highly organized capital market; the in-
crease of motivation toward market control. For these develop-
ments the data permitted a fairly detailed scrutiny of possible
causal relationships. Other major theories could not be considered
because of the lack of relevant data.
Relationship to Industrial Retardation
A popular explanation of the early merger movement is that it
marked a period in United States economic development in which
retardation of growth set in. Mergers, in this context, were inter-
preted as devices whereby producers could preserve profits in the
face of slackening demand and greater pressures of competition.
One of the principal exponents of this thesis, Myron Watkins,
described the process as follows:
The opening of a new and wider market involves pioneering
costs which call for the compact association of producers. But
once a new market has been opened by the joint action of the
associated producers, its development attracts the ambition
and varied talents of many producers, the prizes for successful
competition being high. The third and final phase is reached
when the limit of the expansion of a given market has been
touched, and the amount and character of its consumption
have become settled and known. The gains from initiative and
ingenuity are then no longer sufficient to hold producers upon
an independent course, and they fall in together for their
common enrichment at the expense of consumers.'
'Myron Watkins, IndustrialCombinationsand Public Policy, Cambridge, 1927, pp. 12—13.
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Watkins went on to describe the historical trends to which he
attributed the retardation in market growth: the closing of the
frontier, the slackening of population growth, the slowing of tech-
nological change, and the post-1873 secular decline in prices. In
his view, these various tendencies converged at the end of the nine-
teenth century and set the stage for the merger movement, which
he described as "a centralizing phase in the organization of indus-
trial control in the United States."2
A thorough test of this hypothesis would involve examination
of the cycles of industry growth in the United States, a project
much too ambitious to undertake here. Instead, a more limited
analysis is offered, which derives its value from examination of
specific data on the general patterns of industrial growth in the
period before 1895, the growth patterns in industries having high
merger activity, and the relation of these patterns to the first
merger wave.
Proponents of the retardation thesis have properly emphasized
that it is retardation in individual industries rather than retarda-
tion in aggregate industrial growth that is important in merger
behavior. However, they failed to deal seriously with the next
logical step in the thesis, determination of the degree of retarda-
tion necessary to compel firms to merge. This omission is under-
standable, because the tools for predicting competitive behavior
are certainly not sharp enough for the task. What the retardation
thesis seems to imply, in this respect, is that at the turn of the
century there was a change in the pattern of industrial growth of
sufficient magnitude or abruptness to force competitors to band
together to alleviate the ruinous tendencies of falling demand and
drastic price decline. The retardation would have had to take the
form of either an absolute decline in production or a drastic drop
in the rate of growth prevailing in the period just preceding the
merger wave. If the decline were more gradual, it would be diffi-
cult to demonstrate that, at a certain date, the retardation had
reached that critical level at which firms were compelled to merge.
We shall look to see if (1) there was a marked increase in general
retardation just preceding the merger movement, and if (2) the
industries characterized by high merger activity were in fact those
experiencing retardation.
Before testing the growth retardation—merger thesis,let us
briefly examine the way in which retardation has been measured.




trends in the United States.3 They relate to the rate of growth of
various series of production data for overlapping decades (eleven
years) from 1870 through 1930. The first decade for which growth
is measured is 1870—1880, in which 1875 is the central year; the
second decade is 1875—1885, and so on. Exponential trends were
fitted to the annual data for each of the decades, and the rate of
growth was taken from the trend equations thus obtained.
In terms of these rates of growth data, retardation exists if suc-
cessive decades are consistently characterized by rates of growth
lower than the rates of the decades preceding them. Burns found
retardation, thus defined, to have been the overwhelmingly com-
mon pattern of industry growth in the period 1870—1930.'
THE GENERAL PATFERN OF GROWTH
If retardation was a factor in the turn-of-the-century merger
movement, there should appear at least sustained retardation in
the period immediately preceding the merger wave. Sharply in-
creased retardation would of course be a stronger indication that
retardation was a factor. The evidence available to measure the
change in industry growth is found in Burns's study, from which
Table 41 is reproduced. It includes production series of industries
in agriculture and fisheries, mining, manufactures and construc-
tion, transportation and trade, thus providing a general picture of
the pattern of growth.
The table shows that the two overlapping decades immediately
preceding the period of merger activity at the turn of the century,
1890—1900 and 1895—1905, saw the stabilization or reversal of the
pattern of retardation characteristic of the decades preceding them.
This appears in the proportion of series experiencing an increase
at the rate of 10 per cent or more per year, and also in the propor-
tion of series experiencing a negative rate of increase. The decade
1890—1900 saw stabilization in the proportion of series experi-
encing a rate of increase of 10 per cent or more. The decade 1895—
1905 saw a substantial increase in the proportion of the high
growth rate series. Comparison of the proportions of increases of
10 per cent and over for the three decades 1900—1910, 1905—1915,
3 Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United Slates Since 1870, National Bureau of
Economic Research, 1934, Chapter III.
4 Burns also demonstrated the existence of long-run cycles in the secular trend, which
he called trend-cycles. He showed their existence by the decade exponential
trend rates with the decade rates of what he called the primary trend (Ibid., pp. 175ff.).
Adjustment to take account of the long-cycle factor is not required, however, for present
purposes; the change in growth patterns that business firms respond to is the gross effect
of retardation and trend cycles.
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TABLE 41
Increases and Decreases in Production Growth Rates, by Overlapping Decades,
1870—1930
Rates of 10 per cent
Total and Over Rates of0 or Less
Number Number Percentage Number Percentage
of Series of of series of of series
Decade Covered series covered series covered
1870—1880 66 16 24.2 6 9.1
1875—1885 69 20 29.0 5 7.2
1880—1890 97 17 17.5 8 8.2
1885—1895 104 11 10.6 10 9.6
1890-1900 104 10 9.6 8 7.7
1895—1905 104 21 20.2 8 7.7
1900—1910 104 8 7.7 11 10.6
1905—1915 104 4 3.8 17 16.3
1910—1920 104 9 8.7 22 21.3
1915—1925 102 5 4.9 43 42.2
1920—1930 102 6 5.9 26 25.5
Source Arthur F. Burns, Production Trends in the United States Since 1870,National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1934, p. 81, Table 13.
and 1910—1920 indicates that the high rate of increase carried well
into the twentieth century, probably, at least until the end of high
merger activity in 1905.°
These data do not reveal the pattern of growth to be expected
if the retardation thesis were valid, for the pattern found was
marked by neither a continuation of the retardation nor by its
marked increase. Indeed, the data reveal quite the opposite picture.
The pattern of changes in Table 41 shows a marked decline in
the rate of growth in the 1905—19 15 decade. This roughly co-
incides with the decade of low merger activity from 1905 through
1914. Further, the resumption of higher growth rates in the period
1915—1920 was accompanied by a revival of merger activity. Thus
it appears that merger activity was more commonly found in
periods of increased general acceleration than in periods of in-
creased retardation in industry growth.
It is dangerous, however, to infer from these findings that in-
dustrial growth retardation had no positive connection with
The one and one-half decades preceding the high merger activity of the late 1920's
also saw a reversal of the retardation pattern (Table 41). Moreover, the general accelera-
tion of the late 1920's might be understated by Burns's sample, which does not include
more recently founded industries and thus may indicate a fictitiously low number of
rapidly growing series. A good case probably could be made against the growth-retarda-
tion—merger thesis by a detailed examination of the growth rates of high-merger industries
in this later period.
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mergers. Mergers were prominent in only some of these industries.
It is important to know whether the industries of high merger
activity were among those characterized by increasing or decreas-
ing rates of growth preceding the initiation of mergers. We turn
now to this question.
GROWTH RATES IN INDUSTRIES OF HIGH MERGER ACTIVITY
The data provided by Burns's study permit the testing of the
growth-retardation—merger hypothesis for the specific industries
in which the greater amount of merger activity took place. Of the
seventy-seven series in mining and manufacturing which Burns
presents, forty-four are related directly to industries in which there
was a high degree of merger activity. Only three two-digit indus-
tries of high merger activity—paper and allied products, fabricated
metal products, and machinery (except electrical)—had no rele-
vant production series. The industries having high merger activity
in 1895—1904 and the number of production series relating to them
are presented in Table 42. In terms of firmdisappearances, the
TABLE 42








Food and kindred products (20) 524 8
Tobacco products (21) 133 4
Chemicals (28) 221 3
Stone, glass (32) and nonmetallic minerals (14) 276 5
Iron andsteelmills, foundries and mines (331,332, 101) 391 6
Nonferrous smelting, refining, foundries, mines (333—
336, 102—104) 85 13
Transportation equipment (37) 127 2
Bituminous coal mining (12) 305 3
Metal products (34) 185 0
Machinery, except eLectrical (35) 142 0
Paper and allied products (26) 116 0
Source: Worksheets and Table C-2.
eight industries for which relevant production series are available
accounted for 83 per cent of all 1895—1904 merger activity, and for
92 per cent of the merger activity in those industries having more
than forty disappearances. They were also the industries of highest
merger activity relative to industry size.
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The trend of the growth rate pattern for the forty-four produc-
tion series applicable to the eight industries of greatest merger
activity is presented in Table 43. It gives the same kind of informa-
tion that was presented in Table 41 for the 104 series included
there, but Table 43 is more detailed in that it also shows the trend
in the 0 to 5 per cent and 5 to 10 per cent classes of growth rates,
as well as in the other two classes of 10 per cent and over and below
0 per cent.
Table 43 reveals that the period immediately preceding the in-
tense merger activity beginning in 1898 was characterized by
TABLE 43
Annual Growth Rates of Industries with High 1895—1904




PercenLoge of Series by Average
Growth Rate of Output
Annual
10% 5.0—9.9 0.0—4.9Less ihan
Decade Covered or more % % 0
1870—1880 23 26.1 43.5 21.7 8.7
1875—1885 24 37.5 45.9 8.3 8.3
1880—1890 38 18.4 44.7 34.2 2.7
1885—1895 44 9.1 43.1 45.5 2.3
1890—1900 44 11.4 43.1 41.0 4.5
1895—1905 44 31.8 47.7 18.2 2.3
1900—1910 44 11.3 41.0 41.0 6.7
1905—1915 44 6.8 25.0 59.1 9.1
Source: Table C-2.
acceleration rather than retardation in the growth of the industries
of high merger activity. In the three overlapping decades 1885—
1895, 1890—1900, and 1895—1905 there were successively larger
decade-rates of growth. The proportion of series experiencing
annual rates of growth of more than 10 per cent increased from
9.1 per cent to 31.9 per cent of the total number of series. The
proportion of series experiencing a 5.0 to 9.9 per cent rate of
growth increased from 43.2 per cent to 47.8 per cent of the total.
The proportion of the total number of series experiencing a less
than 5 per cent rate of growth decreased from 47.8 per cent to
20.5 per cent of the total.
After the 1895—1905 decade the retardation resumes, but not
sufficiently to offset the preceding acceleration. The decade 1900—
1910 saw a return to the growth-rate pattern of the 1885—1895
decade, and not to the lower growth rates that a projection of the
pre-1885 retardation pattern would signify. Thus a substantial in-
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creasein retardation does not reappear until after the period of
high merger activity.
The growth rates for individual high merger industries bear out
these findings. As Table 44 shows, in none of the eight industries
TABLE 44
Average Annual Percentage Rates of Growth for Eight Industries of High 1895—1907





















Food (20) 8 4.666.584.585.303.706.53 2.582.73
Tobacco (21) 4 3.305.508.134.752.133.304.805.05
Chemicals (28) 3 13.7515.856.705.737.576.33 5.073.27
Stone, glass, etc.
(32, 14) 5 ... ...11.688.7213.6220.7211.206.16
Iron and steel
(331—332, 101) 6 12.2810.207.923.434.359.85 5.183.92
Transportation
equipment (37) 2 —4.1—3.7 1.10.551.313.15—0.554.35
Nonferrous
metals (333—
336, 102—104) 13 9.067.905.9510.159.027.88 4.745.34
Bituminous coal
(121) 3 5.2511.458.005.105.879.07 6.073.70
Source: Table C-2.
wastherean appreciable increase in retardation in the three
decades1885—1895, 1890—1900, and 1895—1905. Four of the eight
industries (32 and 14; 331—332 and 101; 37;and121) enjoyed a
sustainedacceleration over this period. Two (20, 21) saw a reversal
of a previous pattern of retardation. In one (28), the 1895—1905
rate of growth was higher than the 1885—1895 rate but lower than
the 1890—1900 rate. Only one industry, nonferrous metals (manu-
facturing, 333—336, and mining, 102—104), experienced a sustained
retardation over the three overlapping decades. It is noteworthy
that merger activity in nonferrous metals remained at a fairly high
level in the decade 1905—1914, while that of most other industries
dropped off sharply after 1902. Thus the 1905—1915 acceleration of
nonferrous production coincided with a relative increase of non-
ferrous merger activity.
CONCLUSION
Statistical examination of the growth.retardation—merger rela-
tionship indicates that there is little empirical basis for believing
that the turn-of-the-century merger wave was caused by a general
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retardation in industry growth thought to be prevalent at that
time. The last one and one-half decades of the nineteenth century
saw the halting and reversing of the previous decline in growth
rates for industry in general. In the industries of high merger
activity, the reversal of retardation was even more pronounced
than it was for industry in general. Measured on an industry-by-
industry basis, retardation was generally absent from industries of
highest merger activity in the decade and one-half preceding the
merger wave. Indeed, these findings suggest that more satisfactory
explanations of merger movements may be found in periods of
accelerating growth than in periods of retardation. This possibility
is explored in more detail in Chapter 5.
England had a large merger wave almost simultaneous with the
early American movement. Apparently the merger wave in Britain,
like that in the United States, occurred during a period of accelera-
tion rather than of retardation. The British experience is presented
in detail in Appendix A.
Development of the Transportation System
Another frequent explanation for the merger movement at the
end of the nineteenth century is the achievement of a national net-
work of railroads at that time. This brought about a fundamental
change in the nature of markets for goods, it is held. Producers now
found it possible to sell their goods in wider markets, thus bringing
themselves into more direct competition with other producers who
previously had enjoyed a degree of geographical isolation. One of
the principal exponents of the thesis, Joe S. Bain, summarized
the development as follows:
"Competition was intensified by the continuing growth of the
railroad systems, which tended to bring all of the principal
firms together in direct competition for a single national
market. The economy was passing from a situation where a
fairly large number of small manufacturers sold their pro-
ducts, each in a limited local market somewhat protected by
high costs of transportation, to a situation where a few large
firms vied among themselves for sales in a single market. In
the new environment, price competition was potentially
ruinous to
°Joe S. Bain, "Industrial Concentration and Government Anti-Trust Policy," in
The Growth of the AmericanEconom,,H. F. Williamson, ed., Prentice-Hall, 1944, p.710.
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In this view, producers combined to eliminate increasing com-
petition. Through merger, ruinous price competition could be
avoided, and the markets for their products could be "stabilized."
Running through much of the transportation growth—merger
hypothesis, and frequently taken as an inseparable part of it, is the
argument that the development of national markets permitted the
realization of economies of scale in production. This argument will
not be examined here for the following reasons. First, the empirical
examination of scale economies is much too complex to permit a
satisfactory analysis in this limited study.7 Second, transportation
improvement is only one of the ways by which the market expan-
sion needed to realize economies of scale can be achieved. Popula-
tion growth within fixed geographical regions, cultural change,
and per capita income growth are factors of possibly greater impor-
tance. Brief comment on the significance of scale economies is
made in a later section. The present task is to examine transporta-
tion development as a cause of mergers, apart from economies of
scale.
PLAN OF EMPIRICAL EXAM1NATION
If transportation growth favored mergers we should expect the
industries in which the greatest merger activity occurred to have
the following characteristics: First, the prdduct would be of such
nature that per-mile transportation costs are fairly large relative
to product price. Reduced transportation costs would produce a
large relative change in delivered prices in distant markets, and
thus provide the stimulus required to induce faraway producers to
meet the prices of near-by producers. Second, the production of the
product would be quite widely dispersed. If all producers were
located in the same small geographical area a decline in transpor-
tation costs would not change the character of the competition;
it would already be a national market in the sense that all sellers
could compete for the patronage of all buyers.
To test the validity of the transportation growth—merger hypo-
thesis in this context, three separate factors in the relationship will
be examined. First, it must be determined whether, as a matter
of fact, the transportation network did expands and transportation
costs did decline, in the years preceding the merger movement. If
these developments did not occur, or if there were only a small
growth in transportation, the hypothesis would fail for lack of a
causal factor.
Some observations concerning their significance are given in a later section of the
chapter.
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Second,giventheunderlyingpre-mergertransportation
developments, it is then necessary to determine the proportion of
the merger movement accounted for by industries having high per-
mile transportation costs relative to the price of the product. This
provides a rough measure of the proportion of total merger activity
that could have occurred in response to declines in transportation
cost. If this share is relatively small, the transportation growth
factor can have played only a contributory rather than a dominant
role in the movement.
Third, it must be determined whether the industries with high
per-mile transportation costs relative to product price had widely
dispersed producing centers. If these industries were concentrated
in relatively small geographical areas, then reductions in transpor-
tation costs would not alter the effective market areas of firms
relative to each other.
PRE-MERGER TRENDS IN TRANSPORTATION GROWTH
The data describing transportation growth apply to railroads
only. This was the overwhelmingly important form of inter-
regional freight transportation in the last two decades of the nine-
teenth century. It was also the only form of transportation for
which comprehensive detailed data were available.
The development of the railroad transportation system and the
trend in freight rates and wholesale prices are described in Table
45. The period 1882—1900 saw a large absolute expansion in the
railroad system. Miles of track increased from 114,400 to 193,000,
or by 69 per cent. Ton-miles of freight carried increased from
39.3 million to 141.6 million, an increase of 260 per cent. The cost
of freight transportation dropped from 1.236 cents per ton-mile in
1882 to 0.729 cents in 1900, a drop of 41 per cent.
It is not possible to compare the 1882—1900 changes with trans-
portation growth of earlier periods since data on freight ton-miles
and revenue per ton-mile are unavailable before 1882. However,
the 1882—1900 development can be compared with that of the post-
1900 period. The period 1900—1916, being comparable in length
to the 1882—1900 period and preceding the World War I period
of rapidly increased activity, was chosen. The comparisons are
presented in Table 45. The data are of average annual rates of
change computed, using the compound-interest formula, from the
values for the initial and terminal years of each period.
The data presented in the table indicate a higher rate of rail-
road transportation growth in 1882—1900 than in 1900—1916. This
was true for both miles of track and for ton-miles of freight hauled.
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TABLE 45
Railroad Mileage, Freight Ton-Miles, Freight Revenue per Ton-Mile, and
Wholesale Prices, 1882—19 16
Wholesale Price
Railroad MileageFreight Ton-MilesFreight Revenue per Index
Tear(thousands of miles) (millions) Ton-Mile (cents)(nts, 1926= 100)
1882 114.4 39.3 1.236 66.1
1884 125.1 44.7 1.124 60.5
1886 133.6 52.8 1.042 56.0
1888 154.2 65.4 0.977 57.4
163.4 163.6 79.2 76.2 0.927 0.941 56.2
1892 171.6 88.2 0.898 52.2
1894 178.7 80.3 0.860 47.9
1896 182.8 95.3 0.806 46.5
1898 186.4 114.1 0.753 48.5
1900 193.3 141.6 0.729 56.1
1902 202.5 157.3 0.757 58.9
1904 213.9 174.5 0.780 59.7
1906 224.4 215.9 0.748 61.8
1908 233.5 218.4 0.754 62.9
1910 240.3 255.0 0.753 70.4
1912 246.8 264.1 0.744 69.1
1914 252.1 288.8 0.737 68.1
1916 254.3 383.5 0.719 85.5
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE RATES OF CHANGE:
Railroad Freight Intensity of• Revenue per Wholesale
Period Mileage Ton-MilesTrack Utilization Ton-Mile Prices
1882—1900 +3.0 +7.3 +4.3 —3.7 —0.9
1900—1916 + 1.9 +5.8 —3.9 no appreciable +2.7
change
The two values for 1890 represent a shift in data sources. For the period 1882—1890
the Interstate Commerce Commission compiled railroad statistics from annual issues
of Poor's Manual of Railroads. From 1890 forward the data were compiled from the direct
reports of railroads to the i.c.c.
Source for railroad statistics: Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789—1945, Bureau
of the Census, 1949, pp. 200, 203, Series K-2, 15, 16, 29, 45, and 47.
However, some of the growth in track mileage may have dupli-
cated existing railroad connections. This is suggested by the fact
that the rate of growth in the intensity of track utilization was
only slightly larger in 1882—1900 than in 1900—1916. The develop-
ment for the whole period before and after the merger wave
primarily represented the progressive rail saturation of limited
geographical areas rather than the tying together of distant
markets.8
However, most pre-1882 economic activity was centered in the northeastern section
of the country. The filling-in of the rail network may thus have had a greater effect on
competition than the extension of the transcontinental rail lines through the sparsely
populated and economically small western part of the country.
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The cost of rail freight transportation, as indicated by revenue
per ton-mile, dropped at an average rate of 3.7 per cent per year
in the eighteen years preceding the turn of the century, and re-
mained essentially constant in the sixteen years following 1900.
In absolute terms the pre-1900 and post-1900 changes were distinct.
However, relative to the wholesale price level of commodities, the
price of rail freight transportation declined at about the same rate
in 1882—1900 and 1900—1916. From 1882 to 1900 revenue per ton-
mile declined markedly, while wholesale prices declined moder-
ately. From 1900 to 1916 revenue per ton-mile remained constant,
while wholesale prices rose substantially. In both periods the
annual percentage change in revenue per ton-mile was about 2.8
points below that of wholesale prices.
These findings thus suggest that transportation growth in the
decade and one-half before the merger wave was not radically
different from that in the decade and one-half following it. In both
periods the growth was large and represented intensive rather than
extensive growth in the railroad system. There was a sustained fall
in the relative price of transportation all through the period, with
no sharp break in 1900. The somewhat larger pre-1900 rate of
growth might have made it more likely thai a merger wave would
occur about 1900 rather than later. However, the evolutionary
pattern of development throughout the period indicates that this
difference was probably unimportant.
It is probable that the pre-1882 growth of railroads was even
more rapid than the 1882—1900 growth. Thus, while it can be
argued on this theory that the merger wave would have been less
likely to occur after 1900, there is no equally strong evidence that
it could not have occurred considerably earlier than 1900. Probably
any period from 1875 to 1900 could be characterized as following
upon a decade of very rapid transportation growth.
MERGER ACTIVITY AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS
While transportation growth in 1882—1900 was not greatly differ-
ent from that of the period following, it was, nevertheless, large
and significant. Therefore further exploration of the transporta-
tion growth—merger relationship is of interest, and we turn tQ the
question whether mergers occurred in industries we would expect•
to respond more vigorously to changes in transportation costs—
i.e., in industries where transportation costs are high, but not pro-
hibitive, relative to the price of the product.
In order to demonstrate the Incidence of high and low trans-
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portation costs among industries in which merger activity occurred,
the following breakdown by transportation costs has been made:
1. Industries with a characteristically local market
2. Industries with low transportation costs relative to price of
product
3. Industries with high transportation costs relative to price of
product
4. Industries for which the role of transportation costs could
not be clearly ascertained
The first category, local market industries, includes breweries,
firms producing brick, sand and gravel, crushed stone, ice, and the
like. The extreme weight and bulk of the products, and the
ubiquity of their source materials have restricted their markets to
local areas despite marked reductions in transportation costs. This
category also includes highly perishable products. The second cate-
gory, industries with national markets but low transportation costs
in relation to price of product, contains nonperishable and semi-
perishable products whose production involved complex prepara-
tion processes. The third category, industries with national markets
and high includes basic minerals and products
of large bulk and weight with a low degree of fabrication. It also
includes products such as sheet glass which, by virtue of their
fragility,involve high transportation costs. The fourth, non-
allocable, category includes nonperishable products of low bulk
and weight, with a moderate degree of fabrication, and highly
fabricated 'but bulky products. In this category were also placed
those products whose transportation cost characteristics were too
unclear (to the writer) to allow assignment to another category.
The detailed breakdown by industry and product is presented in
Table C-B.
The breakdown of merger activity by the role of transportation
costs is summarized in Table 46. The measure of merger activity
used is firm disappearances by consolidation and acquisition. From
the table it can be seen that at least a majority of mergers occurred
in industries in which transportation costs were an important factor
in the delivered price of the product. One of 2,546 firm disappear-
ances which could be allocated to a major or minor transportation-
importance category, 1,457, or 57 per cent, occurred in industries
where transportation costs were important. The remaining 1,089
disappearances, or 43 per cent, occurred in industries where a
reduction in transportation costs could be expected to have had
little effect. In calculations based on the consolidation series only,
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TABLE 46
Merger Activity in Terms of Relative Importance of Transportation Costs




All mergerConsolidations All mergerConsolidations
Transportation costs of— activity only activity only
Major importance 1,457 1,258 48.4 50.5
Minor importance










3,012 2,493 100.0 100.0
Data for consolidations are listed separately (and examined separately throughout
this test of the transportation hypothesis) because of the large differences in cut-off limits
imposed on the consolidations and acquisitions series (see Chapter 2). There was the risk
that measures of total merger activity might contain appreciable numbers of acquisitions
of small firms, not comparable in size to consolidation disappearances, a factor that might
weaken the test. Detail may not add to totals because of rounding.
Source: Table C-3.
59percent of allocable disappearances occurred in industries in
which transportation costs were important.
The proportion of merger activity in which transportation cost
reductions may have had an effect is sufficiently large to warrant
further investigation. However, a substantial share of merger
activity occurred in industries in which transportation cost declines
would not have had an appreciable effect. Therefore it cannot be
concluded, on the basis of this evidence, that mergers occurred
in high transport-cost industries with greater intensity than in low
transport-cost industries. The next section brings other evidence
to bear.
GEOGRAPHICAL CONCENTRATION AND MERGER ACTIVITY
The transportation growth—merger thesis implies that high
transport-cost industries exhibiting merger activity would have
widely dispersing producing centers. If most producers were con-
centrated in small geographical areas there would be no exclusive
local markets for reduced transportation costs to destroy.
- At the same time, there is some logical reason to expect that
high per-mile transportation costs and geographical concentration
should go together. Firms with high transportation costs are forced
to locate in those usually restricted areas which are optimally
located with respect to materials, power and labor resources. and
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buyers. Thus, on the purely technical grounds of cost minimiza-
tion, we should expect to find higher geographical concentration
in industries with high per-mile transportation costs than in those
with lower costs. It follows that we might expect to find closer
proximity of firms in those very industries in which transport-cost
reductions are supposed to break down barriers between distant
firms. Thus the historical decline in transport costs might be
credited wrongly with achieving a condition which already existed.
This is merely an exercise in deductive logic, however. We shall do
better to examine the empirical evidence.
An indication of the greater geographical concentration of high
transport-cost industries is provided in Table 47. The geographical
TABLE 47
Geographical Concentration of Manufacturing among Industries Classified by the Size of















Local markets .312 .293
Cost not ascertained 5 .451 .454
Total 23 .471 .511
by net firm disappearances.
Source: Tables C-3 and C-4.
concentration of an industry was measured by using, as an index,
the proportion of industry wage-earner employment in the three
adjoining states of highest employment. These indexes were
derived from the 1905 Census of Manufactures fortwo- and
three-digit industries for which merger activity was recorded. The
industries accounted for 1,676 net disappearances, or 68.5 per cent
of the 2,445 net manufacturing disappearances of 1895—1904.
Among these industries the high transport-cost industries showed
higher geographical concentration than either low transport-cost
industries or merger industries in general.
To determine more directly whether there was a negative rela-
tionship between merger activity and geographical concentration,
as the transportation growth—merger thesis implies, a correlation
analysis was made. It was possible to correlate relative merger
activity with geographical concentration for twenty two- and three-
digit industries. The comparison is presented in Table 48. It can
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TABLE 48





Clasnjlcation actiutty only Concentration
Meat products (201) 0.294 0.013 0.547
Dairy products (202) .201 1.38 .290
Canning fruits and vegetables (203) .786 .728 .307
Grain mill products (204) .153 .138 .247
Tobacco products (21) .949 .573 .543
Textiles (22) .136 .135 .480
Lumber and furniture (24—25) .083 .068 .180
Paper and allied products (26) .561 .540 .455
Printing, publishing (27) .031 .026 .336
Industrial organic chemicals (282) .061 .041 .280
Paints (285) .334 .324 .542
Fertilizers (287) .953 .746 .274
Petroleum (291) .007 .007 .365
Leather (311) .163 .159 .505
Glass (32 1—323) .402 .398 .636
Iron and steel (331—332) 2.505 2.311 .688
Farm machinery (352) .730 .709 .518
Electrical machinery etc. (36) .439 .388 .571
Motor vehicles (371) 2.190 1.654 .507
Ship and Boat building (373) .342 .328 .348
Coefficient of rank correlation :b
All merger activity .i- 0.421
Consolidations only ÷ 0.479
a Measured as ratio of merger capital to industry capital. For a more detailed description
of this measure see Chapter 2.
bBothcoefficients of correlation are signifi:ant at the 5 per cent level but not at the
1 per cent level of significance.
Source: Table C-4.
be seen that a moderate degree of positive relationship existed
between the merger activity of an industry and its geographical
concentration, which suggests that less intensive merger activity
occurred in industries in which producing centers were widely
dispersed.
When the high- and low-transport cost industries are examined
separately, the negative relation between geographical concentra-
tion and merger activity suggested by the transportation growth—
merger hypothesis is further contradicted, as Table 49 shows. The
average relative merger activity in high-transport cost industries
(0.620 and 0.528) is lower than that in low-transport cost industries
(0.721 and 0.5 74). Moreover, the rank correlation between mergers
and geographical concentration in high-transport cost industries is
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JTHE FIRST MERGER WAVE
higher (+ 0.571 and +0.327) than in low-transport cost industries
(+ 0.357 and + 0.286). While the sampling reliability of this test is
small, the findings are nonetheless opposite to the comparison that
the transportation growth—merger hypothesis would lead us to
expect.9 High-transport cost industries should, on that theory, ex-
hibit a more negative merger—geographical concentration correla-
tion than that exhibited by low-transport cost industries.
CONCLUSION
From an empirical examination of the relationship between the
growth of the railroad transportation system and the 1895—1904
merger movement certain relationships have been demonstrated.
First, the merger wave occurred during a large and protracted ex-
pansion of the railroad system, and during a substantial decline in
the relative cost of transportation. Second, a considerable part of
total 1895—1904 merger activity in manufacturing and mining took
place in those industries in which transportation costs were large
relative to the price of the product.
However, the geographical concentration of high-transport cost
industries was higher than that for low-transport cost industries,
suggesting that there were few geographical barriers to be broken
down by transportation cost reductions. Moreover, while the trans-
portation growth—merger hypothesis would lead us to expect a
negative relationship between merger activity and geographical
concentration, the results show a positive relationship between
them. The relationship was more positive for industries with high
transport costs than for those with low transport costs, again in
contradiction to what we would expect if transportation growth
had a significant effect on merger behavior. The findings there-
fore cast doubt on the theory that mergers occurred principally
among firms that had seen the growth of transportation destroy
their local markets, formerly protected by the barriers of high
transport costs.
It appears that the high proportion of merger activity occurring
in industries with high transport costs was not due to reductions
in these Costs. The more correct interpretation seems to be that
the industries in which merger activity occurred were only inci-
dentally those with high transport costs. Since mergers occurred
in a number of important industries and since these industries
The samples are too small to permit firm conclusions to be drawn from the compari-
sons. Neither correlation departs significantly from zero at either the 1 per cent or the
S per cent level of significance. The difference between the two correlation coefficients
is likewise not statistically significant.
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were as commonly characterized by high as by low transportation
costs, it follows that a substantial part of merger activity involved
industries with high transportation costs. Beyond this, however, no
cause and effect inference seems justified.
Examination of the English merger movement indicates that in
England, too, transportation factors were not likely to have been
important (see Appendix A). The significant developments in
English transportation occurred too many decades before the
merger movement to be credited with playing an important role
in mergers.
The Capital Market
Another common explanation of the timing of the early merger
wave is the development in the United States of an organized large-
scale capital market. The existence by the late 1890's of a large
capital market has been held necessary for the absorption of the
large securities issues of the multimillion dollar consolidations of
the era. A corollary thesis is that an organized capital market was
the milieu in which financiers and promoters could marshal the
financial power needed to induce or coerce independent firms to
surrender their independence and enter the large consolidations.
Without a highly developed market for capital, it is argued, the
large, highly capitalized consolidations of the period would have
been difficult, if not impossible to accomplish.
The emergence of the merger movement is so intricately inter-
woven with concurrent developments in the capital market as to
prohibit simple cause and effect explanations. It has been argued
with persuasiveness that an organized large-scale capital market
was a prerequisite for absorbing the large securities issues of the
multimillion dollar consolidations of the era.'° On the other hand
it has been argued that the formation of many new highly capital-
ized consolidations was the substance upon which the capital
market fed in its rapid growth to maturity.1' Conclusive tests of
these relationships are beyond the scope of this study. Instead a
brief description of the growth of the securities markets in this
period is offered, as a context in which to place subsequent exam-
inations of specific aspects of the capital market—merger relation-
ship.
10See,for example, George J. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," Papers
'and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, May 1950, pp. 27—31.
11T.R. Navin and M. V. Sears, "The Rise of a Market For Industrial Securities,
1887—1902," The Business History Review, June 1955.
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The growth of the capital market in the years leading up to the
merger movement is reflected in the growth of the New York Stock
Exchange. From the years following the Civil War until the mid-
1890's the number of stock issues listed rose almost continuously
(Chart 4). An increasing number of firms, mainly railroads, elected
CHART4
Number of Listed Stock issues and Number of Stock Shares Traded,
New York Stock Exchange, 1874—19 18
to seek the wider sources of funds available by listing securities on
the organized exchange. In contrast to the growth in the number
of issues, the period 1882—1896 exhibited a decline in the total
number of shares traded. The average volume of trading per issue
therefore declined markedly. Railroad stocks dominated the Ex-
change in this period as industrials had not yet gained general
acceptance among investors.12 It was therefore principally the rail-
12 Ibid.
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road issues that suffered from the progressively more shallow
market. This period was followed by the extensive railroad re-
organizations of the1890's,largely under the leadership of
J. P.
After 1895 the number of listed issues leveled off, while trading
activity rose sharply; the market for the average issue became much
deeper than before. 'These changes probably reflected two develop-
ments. First, the extensive railroad reorganizations succeeded in re-
placing many small railroad issues with fewer large issues. Second,
and less important, the listing of a new industrial consolidation
often meant that the issues of the several firms entering the con-
solidation went off the list. The long-run increase in the number
of issues listed was thus offset by the railroad and industrial con-
solidation issues of this period. Since the railroad reorganizations
began in the early 1890's and industrial issues did not gain wide
acceptance until 1897, it seems likely that the stock issues of indus-
trial mergers were more the beneficiaries of the deepening of the
market than its cause.
Among the outstanding stock market features of the period after
1897 was the increased sale of new industrial issues to the public,1'
hitherto sold principally by stockholder subsctiption. The post-
1897 period was also noted for the development of the large-scale
underwriting of industrial securities—a development not fully
established, however, until after 1902. It is worth notice that the
total volume of trading activity of 1901 was exceeded in only one
year before 1919.
This description suggests that, by the late 1890's, the capital
market had reached a sufficiently advanced stage of development
to be capable of playing an important role in the merger move-
ment. The quantitative and qualitative growth of the New York
Stock Exchange from the early 1880's to the late 1890's was.
appreciable and was apparently based largely on factors other than
the financing of mergers. With these developments at least ten-
tatively established, an examination of certain aspects of the role
of the capital market in the merger movement may proceed.
A rough demonstration of the degree to which merging firms
employed the organized securities markets in marketing their
securities issues can be made by determining the proportion of
1897—1902 consolidations whose stock appeared in the lists of
securities traded on the New York Stock Exchange in the three
SeeE. G. Campbell, The Reorganitjziion of theAmericanRailroad Sjstein, 1893—1900,
Columbia Uzuversity Press, 1938.
and Sean, oft. cit.
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years following the formation of each consolidation. Because case-
by-case treatment of the disposition of stock issued by consolidations
was impracticable, listing of a common or preferred stock on the
New York Stock Exchange is here assumed to signify public trading
activity for the stock. The share of the consolidations of the period
of greatest merger activity, 1897—1902, whose stocks were traded
on the New York Stock Exchange is presented by years in Table 50.
TABLE 50
Consolidations of 1897—1902 Whose Stocks Appeared on the York Stock Exchange











Tear TradedAll TradedAll TradedAll dations anceszations
1897 2 9 27 73 70.0110.9 22.2 37.0 63.1
1898 11 26 177311 527.2616.2 42.3 56.9 85.6
1899 31 106 52912131333.3 2038.9 43.6 65.4
1900 3 43 20338 81.0382.7 6.1 5.9 21.2
1901 4 52 29413 1471.01872.8 7.7 7.0 78.5
1902 5 49 29315 188.5689.1 10.2 9.2 27.4
Total 56285 81126633671.3 5710.6 19.6 30.5 64.3
Source:
1900—1905.
Worksheets and The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Investors Supplement,
The proportion was about one-fifth of all 1897—1902 consolida-
tions, accounting for about one-third of gross firm disappearances
and more than three-fifths of authorized capitalizations.
These consolidations were the larger ones of the period. The
average capitalization of the consolidations traded on the New
York Stock Exchange was $65.6millions,while the average capital-
ization of consolidations not listed was $8.9 millions. The average
gross firm disappearances into listed consolidations was 14.5 firms,
while the average for nonlisted was 8.1 firms. Only 19.6 per cent
of consolidations of all sizes were listed on the Exchange, whereas
64.8 per cent of consolidations capitalized at $20 million-and-over,
and 78.6 per cent of $50 million-and-over consolidations, were
listed.
When securities not listed on the New York Stock Exchange but
listed on the Boston, Philadelphia, or Baltimore exchanges are in-
cluded in the list, the proportion of 1897—1902 consolidations
whose stocks were traded on the organized exchanges increases
somewhat. The percentage for consolidations increases from 19.6
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per cent to 23.2 per cent; that for gross firm disappearances from
30.5 per cent to 32.4 per cent; and that of consolidation capitaliza-
tions from 64.3 to 68.4 per cent.
These estimates of the proportion of consolidations that utilized
the securities markets exclude those whose securities were traded
on the unlisted markets and on the minor organized exchanges.
By the very nature of the market, detailed statistics for such trading
were not available. Some idea of the amount of unlisted and minor
exchange trading is provided by the general quotation section of
the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Investors Supplement,
which gives bid and asked quotations not only for securities of
listed companies but also for unlisted and inactive stocks. A light
sampling of this sectfon uncovered a number of consolidations
whose stocks were apparently traded in the minor exchanges or in
the unlisted market. Therefore, the proportion of 1897—1902 con-
solidations using the major stock exchanges can be taken as a
rough minimum limit of the proportion of consolidations whose
securities were actively traded in the various securities markets.
From these findings we might infer that a subMantial share of
1897—1902 consolidation activity resulted in the listing of securities
on the organised securities markets. Without knowledge of how
many consolidations used the stock exchanges directly to market
their new security issues, it is still a reasonable conjecture that
many of them found the organized exchanges either directly or
indirectly helpful in raising capital. As anticipated, the issues of
the more highly capitalized larger consolidations were listed more
commonly than those of smaller consolidations.
Next to be examined is the importance of the sale of industrial
securities to the general public for cash during the five-year period
of high merger activity. 1898—1902. The findings will provide an
indirect clue to the role of the securities markets of the period in
selling new issues generally and, by inference, in marketing con-
solidation issues. The inferential error cannot be very grave
because consolidation issues predominated among new securities
issues of these years. The amount of common and preferred stock
issues sold to the general public for cash can be compared with
the amount of such issues exchanged for the tangible and in-
tangible assets and the securities of other companies, including
predecessor companies. In a period of high merger activity we
should expect that the volume of stock exchanged for securities
and assets of other companies would show a much greater degree
of increase than the volume of stock sold to the general public for
cash. If, instead, the relative increase proved greater for cash sales
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to the public, we might attach greater importance to such sales
and to the organized exchanges, in feeding the merger boom.
Estimates of the amount of equity securities issued for public
cash sale and to other companies for assets and securities are pro-
vided in A Study of Saving in the United States.15 These two values
are compared in Table 51 for the low merger year 1897, the high
TABLE 51
Comparison of Cash Sale of Industrial Common and Preferred Stock to General Public
and Issue of Such Stock for Assets or Securities of Other Companies, 1897—1907
(amounts of stock in millions of dollars)
Amount Percentage
Exchanged Exchanged Percentage of
Cashfor assets or Cashfor assets or Amounttwo indicated
issue tosecurities of issue tosecurities of issued purposes
general other general other for all to all
Period public companies public companies purposes5purposes
1897 4 62 6.0 94.0 138 47.8
1898—1902 360 3,026 10.6 89.4 6,205 54.6
1903—1907 28 285 8.8 91.2 447 70.0
a Includes (in addition to the indicated purposes) other cash issues, and stock issued to
own shareholders for new money, or as stock dividends; and stock issued for acquisition
or retirement of own securities. Some of total stock issued was classified as unissued, unsold,
or disposition unknown.
Source: Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, Vol. I, Tables
V-23 and V-24, pp. 503—505.
merger years 1898—1902, and the low merger years 1903—1907. The
comparisons indicate that, as merger activity increased, volume of
stock sold to the public for cash rose relatively more than that of
stock exchanged for other companies' assets or securities. Also, the
public sale of stock declined relatively more as merger activity
waned.
These findings provide positive though not decisive support for
the theory that the development of a large-scale capital market was
necessary to support the merger movement. A well-developed
market might be essential even though none of the new security
issues was sold to the public for cash. The ability to readily "cash
in" securities received in exchange for assets of merged firms would
have been an important factor in persuading entrepreneurs to join
consolidations. Without well-developed securities exchanges, un-
'5 Raymond W. Goldsmith, A Study of Saving in the United States, 3 vols., Princeton
University Press, 1955 and 1956.
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certainty about the abilitytorealize cash for consolidation
securities might have precluded widespread consolidation activity.
Another way of testing indirectly the theory that development
of the capital stock market was a factor in the timing of the large
merger wave and in merger activity in general is by comparing
changes in merger activity with changes in stock prices. Two
measures of merger activity—net firm disappearances by merger,
and adjusted merger capitalizations—.have been correlated with
the industrial stock price index, and with the industrial production
index. The production index was introduced into the analysis on
the assumption that the level of industrial activity is an important
factor in mergers. If differences between the effects of industrial
activity and of stock prices on mergers appear, they may help to
reveal the influence of stock prices.
Quarterly series for mergers, stock prices, and industrial pro.
duction were obtained for the period 1895—1904, which encom-
passed the huge turn-of-the-century merger wave. Table 52 gives
TABLE 52
Coefficients of Correlation of Merger Activity with Stock Prices
and Industrial Production by Quarters, 1895—1904
Measure of Merger Activity
Firm
disappearancesCapitalization
Coefficients of Simple Correlation between—
Mergers and stock prices +0.613 +0.536
Mergers and industrial production +0.259 +0.179
Coefficients of partial correlation between—
Mergers and stock prices after allowing for changes
in industrial production + 0.608 + 0.564
Mergers and industrial production after allowing
for changes in stock prices — 0.243 —0.274
Source data, Tables B-i, B-2, and C-7.
the results of correlating each of the two measures of merger
activity with stock prices and industrial production. Partial cor-
relation analysis was also employed, as the intercorrelation between
stock prices and industrial production was sufficiently high
(+ 0.659) to make the simple correlation coefficients somewhat
misleading.16
18Thecoefficients of simple and partial correlation between mergers and stock prices
are significantly greater than zero at the I per cent level of significance for both measures
of merger activity. Neither the simple nor partial correlation coefficients between mergers
and industrial production depart significantly from zero, with use of the 5 per cent level
of significance, for either measure of merger activity.
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Merger activity exhibits a moderate positive relationship to
stock price changes both before and after allowing for production
level changes. This is true of both measures of merger activity in
roughly the same degree. These correlations were obtained using
unsmoothed merger data, which were subject to sharp interquarter
irregular variations; with smoothed merger data, the correlations
would be higher.
The relationship of merger activity to changes in industrial pro-
duction is much lower than its relationship to stock price changes.
The positive simple correlation coefficients and negative partial
coefficients suggest that the changes in stock prices were responsible
for the positive simple correlation between mergers and industrial
production. When the effects of stock price changes are removed
by partial correlation the "pure" relationship between industrial
production and mergers becomes slightly negative. Since merger
activity generally tends to follow business conditions rather than
to move opposite to them, this finding suggests that, in years of
peak merger activity, movements in stock prices may be more im-
portant than those in industrial production)7
STOCK MARKET EXPERIENCE OF LARGE CONSOLIDATIONS
Much of the debate over the desirability and consequences of
the early merger wave has turned around the financial success of
the large mergers of the period. Arthur Stone Dewing argued that
"the trusts turned out ill," while Shaw Livermore argued that
Dewing's findings needed reappraisal. Dewing compared the earn-
ings of thirty-five prominent consolidations in the ten years follow-
ing the merger with the earnings of the constituent companies
before the merger, and with the promoters' estimates of prospec-
tive earnings. He concluded that the consolidations as a whole
were not particularly successful.18 Livermore traced the earnings
records of 328 mergers until 1932 and concluded that the propor-
tion that were successful was large enough to raise a serious ques-
tion about Dewing's findings.19
An important aspect of the financial experience of these early
mergers, not examined in either of the two studies, is the dividend
record and market-price experience of their common stock. Com-
The experience in the late 1920's also tends to support this hypothesis. Stock prices
rose 150 per cent from 1926 to 1929, merger activity rose 165 per cent, and industrial
production rose only 25 per cent.
18 Arthur S. Dewing, "Statistical Test of the Success of Consolidations,"
Journal of Economics, November 1921, pp. 84—101.
19 Shaw Livermore, "The Success of Industrial Mergers," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
November 1935, pp. 68—96.
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mon stock, unlike senior issues, carried no guarantee of dividends
or interest. It was commonly issued in payment for the goodwill
of the acquired companies, whereas bonds and preferred stock were
issued for tangible assets. The behavior of the common stock, there-
fore, might indicate more accurately the degree to which organizers
of mergers erected sound financial structures and succeeded in
obtaining profitable control of their markets.
Therefore, an examination of the dividend and market-price
records of the common stock of thirteen large 1899 or 1901 con-
solidations was undertaken.2° The market price of the stock of
each was recorded on the first market day in December of the year
of the consolidation. As most of them were organized in the first
half of the year, the observation date is five to ten months after the
organization—sufficient time for the stock to have been "seasoned"
in the market and for the promoters to have played their role and
left the market. A nine-year interval was chosen for tracing the
dividend records of the consolidations; thatis,a medium-run
period, with terminal dates of December 1908 and December 1910
at which the industrial stock price index was neither at a peak nor
a trough. The stock was assumed to have been sold on December 21
of either 1908 or 1910. Crude rates of return were computed, repre-
senting the compound-interest growth in the value of the stock over
the period. The dividends received were included in the growth,
but were assumed to be not reinvested. The reinvestment assump-
tion would have entailed a detailed investigation of market prices
throughout the period and numerous other more complicated com-
putations, which because of the relative shortness of the period
would have increased the rate of return very little.
The market records of the common stocks of the thirteen large
consolidations are presented in Table 53.
If an individual had invested the same amount of money in each
of the thirteen stocks, his return on his investment over this hybrid.
nine-year period would have been 5.9 per cent. If he had invested
an amount in each of the thirteen stocks proportional to the size
of its authorized capitalization his return would have been 7.4 per
cent. This would not have been much better than the 7 per cent
dividend commonly offered on the industrial preferred issues of
this period and the 5 per cent nominal interest rate on industrial
bonds. However, it contrasts favorably with the yields on railroad
bonds of 3.9 per cent in December 1899 and 3.7 per cent in
20Selectionof the thirteen consolidations focused on the need for wide industrial
representation in the sample as well as on highly capitalized firms whose securities had
public sale and continuous price records in the financial journals.
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December 1901. Railroad bonds were the only securities for which
true yield data could be found.
Thus, on the average, the common-stock investor realized a posi-
tive though not very large return on his investment in the nine-year
period following the merger, a period which spanned two serious
TABLE 53




Date ofDec. 1 (2)Dec. 21 Percentage
Organi-of Organi-9yearsDividends Rate of
Company zationzation Tearlater Received Return
United Shoe Machinery 2/7/99 $33.00$178.91$29.34 +22.7
American Car & Foundry 2/20/99 16.75 45.25 16.00 + 15.5
American Smelting & Refining4/4/99 40.25 79.0031.25 + 11.9
U.S. Steel 4/1/01 43.50 72.6321.75 +9.0
American Locomotive 6/10/01 31.13 36.00 10.00 +4.4
American Woolen 3/29/99 22.00 28.00 0.00 +2.7
Distilling Co. of America 7/12/99 8.50 5.95 4.12 +
Republic Iron & Steel 5/3/99 25.38 24.00 0.00 —0.6
American Can 3/19/01 16.25 9.00 0.00 —6.4
Allis-Chalmers 5/7/01 20.50 8.13 0.00 —7.8
American Ice 3/11/99 34.13 4.65 9.00 —9.7
Union Bag & Paper 2/27/99 25.50 9.25 0.00 — 10.7
U.S. Cotton Duck 6/ 4/01 20.50 4.60 0.00 — 15.3




Railroad bond yields :b
Dec. 1899 +3.9
Dec. 1901 +3.7
Weighted by size of authorized capitalization.
bFrederickR. MacaWay, Some Theoretical Problems Suggested by the Movements of Interest
Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices in the United States since 1856, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1938.
Source: Moody's Manuals and Commercial and Financial Chronical, for appropriate years.
crises in the stock market and a major business depression. Further,
common stock was junior to usually heavy issues of 7 per cent
cumulative preferred stock and 5 per cent bonds. That seven of
the thirteen common stocks paid dividends, and seven of the
thirteen offered a positive return on the investment over this period
indicates that the promise to investors of increasing equity value
was at least partly realized in a fair share of cases.
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The almost equal number with unsatisfactory market records
suggests, on the other hand, that a good fraction of the consolida-
tions did not bear out this promise. Possibly the proportion of un-
satisfactory outcomes corresponds to the risks promoters were will-
ing to take. Yet, in the optimism of the years of peak merger
activity, the risk of failure must have looked very small to pro-
moters.
These findings, on balance, probably weaken the argument that
the consolidation movement was due exclusively to the desire of
promoters for high, quick-turnover profits to the neglect of sound
financial principles. One need only recall the personal dislike of
the conservative promoter J. P. Morgan for the speculative pro-
moter "Bet-a-Million" Gates to illustrate the diversity of motives
and techniques among the organizers of early mergers. It seems
unlikely, for example, that Morgan, who had just spent a decade
trying to produce order in the financial structures of railroads,
would zealously participate in the gross overcapitalization of indus-
trial mergers. The statistical test remains inconclusive. The market
dominance achieved by many of these consolidations may have
permitted profits sufficiently large to cover their high-interest and
preferred-dividend commitments—fixed obligations that would
have caused trouble to consolidations failing to secure strong
market positions.
CONCLUSION
The organized securities market had experienced important and
substantial growth in the last quarter of the nineteenth century,
probably as a concomitant of the general economic growth of the
country, and was therefore large enough to support the huge turn-
of-the-century merger wave. The market's immediate relationship
to the merger movement was complex; changes in the capital
market permitted developments in merger activity which, in turn,
caused further changes in the capital market. However, in view of
the earlier and important role played by railroad reorganizations
in these changes in the capital market, industrial mergers were
probably more the beneficiaries of the changes in the capital
marketthan a cause of them.
A large the larger and more important 1897—1902
consolidations listed their stock on the organized securities ex-
changes where it entered into trading activity. Moreover, industrial
securities sold for cash to the general public became a relatively
larger part of new securities issues during the large merger wave.
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A correlation analysis of merger activity and stock-price changes,
using industrial production as a control variable, indicated that in
this period of peak merger activity mergers were more closely re-
lated to stock-price changes than to industrial activity changes.
tndeed, though mergers are probably related positively to long-
run movements in industrial production, in this period the effect
of stock-price changes apparently overrode the immediate influence
of industrial production.
The market experience of the stocks of a small sample of con-
solidations suggests that investors in the common stocks of the
leading consolidations fared not much worse than holders of pre-
ferred stock and perhaps a little better than bondholders. So far as
it goes, this finding lends no support to either of the extreme views
—that common stock of mergers was an investment success, or that
it was merely a device for exploiting gullible investors.
The British merger movement also paralleled more closely
changes in stock prices than changes in industrial production (see
Appendix A). Since the greatest growth in the British capital
market probably occurred much earlier than that in the United
States, it is not a development that can be designated as an im-
mediate cause of the British merger wave very late in the nine-
teenth century. Developments in business organization may be
relevant here. Not until the 1880's in England were the full poten-
tialities of limited liability realized in corporate practice (though
legally prepared for much earlier): what was achieved quickly in
the United States was achieved gradually in Great Britain. A con-
vergence of unrestricted corporate behavior and large capital
markets may have been important in setting the stage for mergers,
and may help explain the almost simultaneous occurrence of great
merger waves in the two countries, at the turn of the century.
The Market Control Motive
A frequent explanation for the nies-ger movement is that mergers
represented attempts on the part of businessmen and financiers to
achieve market control.2' One cannot measure the market control
motive directly. As one of the many manifestations of the profit
motive, market control may he substituted for by other profit-
increasing conditions. Moreover, itis inextricably tied up with
21See,for example, Joe S. Bain, in The Growth of the American Economy, 2nd ed., H. F.
Williamson; ed., Prentice-Hall, 1951, Chap. 32; and Hans B. Thorelli, The Federal
Antitrust Policy, Originof an AmericanTradition, Johns Hopkins Press, 1955, P. 280.
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external economic forces on the entrepreneur.n Lacking direct
observation of the motive, we may study its effects. By examining
the results of the merger wave in terms of market control achieved
we may be able to make inferences about the importance of the
desire for such control.
EVIDENCE OF MARKET CONTROL
data describing the degree of market control achieved by
the major mergers of the 1895—1904 period are taken from The
Truth A bout The Trusts.n In this book Moody estimated the share
of the industry controlled by each of ninety-two important trusts.
No attempt was made to construct independent estimates of shares
of markets controlled, either for the trusts listed by Moody or for
those he did not list, with the following exception. Two industries
in which a high degree of local market control was the character-
istic result of the merger have been added to Moody's list—brew-
eries and ice companies. They were assigned to a percentage-
controlled category designated "large." It should be added that
Moody used this qualitative designation for a number of industries,
where the apparent industry control was substantially more than
50 per cent.
If we assume that the Moody estimates individually are reason-
ably accurate, then our estimates of the proportion of merger
activity resulting in market dominance can be regarded as mini-
mum estimates. A considerable number of mergers not included
by Moody probably achieved a high degree of control in local or
regional markets, where the computations of exact percentages
were not possible.
The number of consolidations achieving given degrees of market
control presented below do not exactly correspond to those pre-
sented in Moody, for two reasons. First, the present writer adopted
different class intervals than Moody's, in order to center the more
common percentages within the class interval. Second, Moody
listed a number of nonmanufacturing or nonmining mergers, and
of pre-1895 trusts, which have been excluded because not covered
by the merger data of this study. One major trust, Standard Oil,
was left out because almost all of its merging activity took place
well before 1896.
Certain adjustments were required in the totals for numbers of
22Acommon explanation of the "increased desire for market control" in certain
industries in the 1890's was the downward pressure on prices caused by what was thought
to be declining demand for the product, aggravated by too much productive capacity.
23John Moody, The Truth About The Tru.rts, Moody, 1904.
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consolidations, firm disappearances, and capitalizations. Earlier
consolidations entering into later consolidations were deducted
from the totals, both for number and capitalizations of mergers;
only the capitalization of the last consolidation in the period was
included.24 But firms absorbed by earlier consolidations later
absorbed by further consolidations were included in the disappear-
ances total. In industries in which acquisition was the dominant
form of merger, the capitalization of the latest incorporatio. of the
parent company was included in the capitalization totals, to make
these mergers comparable to consolidations in this dimension of
size.
The distribution of merger activity in industries in which
market dominance was achieved is presented in Table 54. It is
TABLE 54
Proportion of Merger Activity Accounted for by Merged Firms That
Achieved Market Control, 1895—1904
Consolidations
and Parent Firm Capitalizations
Percentage of Companies Disappearances (millions of dollars)
Industry Percent Percent Percent
Controlled Numberof total Numberoftotal Value of total
42.5—62.5 21 6.7 291 9.7 613.5 10.3
62.5—82.5 24 7.7 529 17.6 2,130.6 35.7
82.5-over 16 5.1 343 11.4 998.0 16.7
"Large" 25 8.0 302 10.0 455.5 7.6
86 27.5 1,465 48.6 4,197.6 70.4
Total merger
activity 313 100.0 3,012 100.0 5,960.9 100.0
Source: See accompanying text.
evident that a substantial share of total 1895—1904 merger activity
did result in securing a leading and often dominant share of the
market. Almost one-half of firm disappearances, and seven-tenths
of merger capitalizations were accounted for by mergers that gained
a leading position in the market. Considering that these are mini-
mum estimates, it might not be too misleading to place the actual
share of disappearances into market-leading firms as high as two-
thirds of all merger disappearances, and the share of such firms'
capitalizations as high as three-fourths or four-fifths of all merger
capitalizations.
24 For a list of major consolidations subsequently entering larger consolidations, see
Table C-6.
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CONCLUSION
Whatever the precise share of merger activity resulting in the
control of markets, the above evidence shows that it was sub-
stantial. As we have noted, it would be extremely shaky reasoning
to attribute this high "monopolization" activity to a fundamental
increase in businessmen's desire for market control. But the find-
ings do warrant certain inferences. First, they tend to demonstrate
the existence of a fairly strong desire to avoid rigorous competition.
Second, if we assume that the promoter and financier were impor-
tant motive forces in the merger movement, it seems probable that
the promise of "monopoly" profits would have served as one of the
more effective inducements for firms to surrender their indepen-
dence.
Note on Economies of Scale
Technological revolution leading to great economies of produc-
tion in large-scale enterprises has been regarded by many merger
students as of transcendent importance. Examination of this factor
is not feasible, largely because the data on mergers lack sufficient
detail for an assessment of scale economies on an individual merger
basis. A few observations of certain aspects of the phenomenon may
be in order, however, for indirect light on its importance in the
early merger movement.
In scanning the basic data gathered in this study, one is struck
by the overwhelming share of merger activity made up of what
appear to be horizontal mergers. The vertical merger was charac-
teristically found in the primary metals industries, but appeared
only infrequently in the great variety of other industries having
large merger activity. This suggests that the economies of vertical
integration, upon which many merger students have placed great
stress, played a relatively small role in the merger movement.
Another feature of the merger movement is the great diversity
in types of production operations among the industries in which
mergers occurred. The description of the industrial composition
of the merger movement presented in Chapter 8 demonstrated that
variety. It is hard to believe that such a variety of technological
developments as would be needed to bring production economies
of scale to these diverse industries could have converged in the
same short period of time.
In the present chapter, the joint contribution of the capital
market and the promoter in the creation of firms controlling major
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shares of their markets emerges as an important factor. It may have
overridden other developments that presumably might have
exerted an influence on merger activity. Emphasis on the control
of markets might well have been more important than cost factors
in determining firm size. It would be difficult to demonstrate that
the most efficient or potentially most efficient firm size from the
cost standpoint was systematically related to the size of the market
—as would have to be demonstrated if scale economies were to be
reconciled with market con
Lacking more complete data with which to test the reasoning,
however, this discussion of scale economies must remain con-
jectural.
Summary and Conclusions
We have examined four historical developments that have been
prominent among the explanations of the early merger movement.
Other common explanations could not be tested, notably econo-
mies of scale, for want of adequate data. Even although the exam-
ination is incomplete, the detailed tests of the several hypotheses
serve to place the merger wave in clearer perspective.
The findings concerning the role of industry growth retardation
in the early merger movement raise a serious question as to the
validity of that hypothesis. The years preceding the merger wave
saw a reversal of the pattern of retardation, especially in the very
industries where merger activity was highest. The observed pattern
of industry growth acceleration could hardly be credited with
causing the kind of increased competitive pressure on business
firms that the retardation hypothesis alleged. Indeed, we would
expect that acceleration of market growth would cause a relaxation
of competitive pressures, and thus a diminution of the impetus
toward merging.
The transportation system underwent a large and protracted
expansion in the decades preceding the merger wave. The effect of
this development on merger activity is hard to assess, however. It
probably did place geographically separated firms in more direct
competition with one another. On the other hand, mergers occurred
more commonly in industries that were geographically concen-
trated than in those more widely dispersed. Furthermore, the
25Stigler(op. cit.,p.29) found that the near-monopolies created at the turn of the
century almost invariably experienced a substantial decline in market share as time
passed.
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growth of transportation was accompanied by, and was probably
a partial cause of, acceleration in market growth, which permitted
a firm to pursue a more independent course. The period was also
characterized by substantial increases in the tariff, protecting
domestic industries from international competition. In view of
these offsetting factors it seems unlikely that transportation growth
could be accounted a major cause of the merger movement.
The findings concerning the role of the capital market in the
merger movement lend considerable support to the thesis that the
development of the capital market was a major cause. The high
correlation between merger activity and stock prices suggests that
much of the merger activity of the period had its origin in, or was
influenced by, the stock market. Further examination indicated
that capital market factors overrode the level of industrial activity
in influencing merger activity. This suggests that cost-price rela-
tionships in business firms were a less important influence than
many students believed.
The desire for market control probably played at least a permis-
sive role in the merger movement. The large proportion of merger
activity resulting in market control suggests that the desire for the
protection thus afforded to profits must have been a factor of sub-
stantial importance in inducing firms to merge. With the growth
of the capital market this desire found an effective means of im-
plementation. Coupled with the expectation of gains to be reaped
from a rising stock market, the added promise of protected profits
must have represented a compelling argument for independent
firms to join into consolidations.
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